The notion of persistently optimal strategy in gambling theory is analogous to that of subgameperfect equilibria in game theory. We prove the existence of persistently -optimal strategies for the players engaged in a nonleavable stochastic game with nite state space.
Introduction and Preliminaries
The purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of persistently -optimal strategies for the players engaged in a nonleavable stochastic game. This is a two-person, multi-stage, zero-sum competition which Maitra and Sudderth (1992) de ned by means of ve elements: a state space S; two nite sets of actions A and B; for player I and II respectively, a law of motion q which maps S A B into the set of probability distributions de ned on S and a bounded utility function u : S ! <: The dynamics of a nonleavable stochastic game N(u)(x) with initial state x 2 S are the following; player I chooses an action a 1 2 A while simultaneosly player II chooses an action b 1 2 B and the game moves to the state X 1 according to the probability distribution q( jx; a 1 ; b 1 ): This ends the rst stage of the game; in the second stage the players choose actions a 2 2 A and b 2 2 B respectively and the game moves to the state X 2 according to the probability distribution q( jX 1 ; a 2 ; b 2 ): By iterating this procedure for an ini nite number of stages an in nite sequence fX n g of states is produced; the payo of the game from player II to player I is de ned to be the expected value of u = lim sup u(X n ): Maitra and Sudderth (1992) proved the existence of -optimal strategies for the players engaged in a nonleavable game N(u) by showing that the game always has a value V in the sense that, for every initial state x 2 S; inf sup E x; ; u = sup inf E x; ; u = V (x) where and range over the set of strategies available to player I and II respectively. For a complete introduction to nonleavable stochastic games we refer to the book of Maitra and Sudderth (1996) ; in what follows we will use the same notation and terminology as in the book and in (Secchi,1997b) without any further comment.
Given > 0 and the initial state x 2 S of the game N(u); a strategy is said to be persistently -optimal for I at x if it is -optimal and, for every n 1 and every partial history p = ((x 1 ; a 1 ; b 1 ); : : :; (x n ; a n ; b n )) of length n; the conditional strategy p] is -optimal for I for the game N(u)(x n ): A family of strategies is persistently -optimal if (x) is persistently -optimal for all x 2 S: Analogous de nitions hold for II. We note that, for all x 2 S; n 1 and all partial histories p = ((x 1 ; a 1 ; b 1 ); : : :; (x n ; a n ; b n )); the game N(u)(x n ) is a proper subgame of N(u)(x); therefore when a player uses a persistently -optimal strategy he cannot gain more than by deviating from in any subgame of N(u)(x): In this sense the de nition of persistently -optimal strategy coincides with that of subgame--perfect equilibria of Selten (1965) . Our terminology stems from gambling theory and from the analogous de nitions due in that setting to Dubins and Sudderth (1977) .
The notion of persistently optimal strategy is related to that of stationarity. In fact, if is anoptimal stationary family of strategies, then is persistently -optimal since, for every x 2 S; n 1 and partial history p = ((x 1 ; a 1 ; b 1 ); : : :; (x n ; a n ; b n )); (x) p] = (x n ): In (Secchi, 1997b) it is shown that an -optimal stationary family is always available to player II when the state space S of the nonleavable game N(u) is nite. However Example 7.13.4 of Maitra and Sudderth (1996) , a variation of an example of Kumar and Shiau (1981) , shows that player I need not have an -optimal stationary strategy at a xed initial state of the game, even if S is nite. Therefore the following theorem takes on interest; together with the results in (Secchi, 1997b) it settles a rmatively the question regarding the existence of persistently -optimal strategies for the players engaged in a nonleavable game with nite state space.
1.1 Theorem. Let > 0: For any nonleavable game N(u) de ned on a nite state space S; a persistently 4 -optimal family of strategies is available to player I.
When the state space of the game S is in nite and the utility u is unbounded, player I need not have a persistently -optimal strategy. This follows from the next example which appears in van der Wal (1981) and is a modi cation of an example given by Blackwell (1967) . Incidentally the example shows that subgame--perfect equilibria need not exist for all zero-sum games with a value.
1.2 Example. Let S = f: : :; ?2; ?1; 0; 1; 2; : : :g; A = f0; 1g; and B = f0g; player II is therefore a dummy and the game is really a one-player one. If x < 0; set u(x) = 2 ?x and q(xjx; 0; 0) = q(xjx; 1; 0) = 1; if x > 0; set u(x) = 0; q(x + 1jx; 1; 0) = 1 ? q(0jx; 1; 0) = b(x)=(2b(x + 1)); with b(x) = 1 + 1 x ; and q(?xjx; 0; 0) = 1: Finally de ne u(0) = 0 and q(0j0; 0; 0) = q(0j0; 1; 0) = 1: Therefore all nonpositive states are absorbing and the utility u is non null only on the strictly negative states.
For all strategies available to player I, let 0 ( ) be the probability that action 1 is chosen at the rst stage of the game. Given an initial state x 2 S; we also de ne the partial histories p n = ((x+1; 1; 0); (x+2; 1; 0); : : :; (x+n; 1; 0)); n 1: Let 0 be the only strategy available to player II. Then, for all x > 0 and all strategies of player I we may compute E x; ;0 u = (1 ? 0 ( ))2 x + 0 ( )(1 ? 0 ( p 1 ])) b(x) 2b(x + 1) 2 x+1 + : : :
2b(x + n) 2 x+n + : : ::
Hence sup E x; ;0 u supf b(x) b(x + n) 2 x : n 0g = b(x)2 x : Let be the strategy selecting action 1 with probability one for the rst n + 1 stages of the game, n 1; and then action 0 forever; then E x; ;0 u = b(x) b(x + n) 2 x : This shows that, for all x > 0; sup E x; ;0 supf b(x) b(x + n) 2 x : n 0g = b(x)2 x : Therefore the game has value V (x) = b(x)2 x : Obviously, V (0) = 0 and V (x) = 2 ?x for all x < 0:
Before proving that no persistently -optimal strategy is available to player I if the initial state of the game is big enough, we nd a necessary condition for a strategy to be -optimal for I when the initial state of the game is strictly positive. Let 0 < 1 and x > 0: If is -optimal for I at x; then b(x)2 x ? = V (x) ?
(
Hence,
Now let = 1; x 5 and assume there is a strategy persistently 1-optimal for I at x: Then for all n 1 and all partial histories p = ((x 1 ; a 1 ; 0); : : :; (x n ; a n ; 0)) with x i > 0; and a i 2 A; i = 1; : : :; n; 1 ? 0 ( p]) x n 2 ?xn :
This inequality and equation ( where we used the fact that b(x + n)=(2b(x + n + 1)) 2=3 for all n 0; if x 1: But 3x + 6 < V (x) ? 1; if x 5; and thus is not persistently 1-optimal at x since it is not 1-optimal.
When S is countably in nite and u is bounded, it is still an open question whether a player engaged in a nonleavable game N(u) has a persistently -optimal family of strategies.
2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Before constructing a family of strategies persistently good for player I in the nonleavable game N(u); we begin by considering a leavable game L(u) de ned on the nite state space S by means of the same law of motion q; utility u and sets of actions A and B for I and II respectively as N(u); but with the additional feature that player I is now allowed to stop the game according to a stop rule t of her choice and the payo from II to I is the expected value of the utility u(X t ) of the state reached by the game when it is stopped. Leavable games have a value and an optimal stationary family of strategies is always available to player II (Maitra and Sudderth, 1992) ; for all > 0; the existence of an -optimal stationary family for player I was proved by Secchi (1997a) .
Set U 0 = u and, for all n 1; de ne U n = u _ GU n?1 where G is the one-day operator de ned for any bounded, real-valued function on S and for every x 2 S; by (G )(x) = inf sup E x; ; ; (2.4) with and ranging over P(A) and P(B); the sets of probability distributions de ned on A and B respectively. For all n 1; U n U n?1 and the sequence fU n g converges to the value U of L(u) (Maitra and Sudderth, 1992) ; the convergence is uniform since S is nite. We now introduce a function : S ! P(A) generating a stationary family 1 which is 2 -optimal for I in L(u): If (x) > u(x); let k = k(x) be such that (x) = U k (x) ? k and set (x) 2 P(A) to be optimal for I in the one-day game A(U k?1 )(x): If (x) = u(x) let (x) be optimal for I in the one-day-game A(U)(x):
For all k 0; de ne (k) = inffn k : (X n ) = u(X n )g = inffn k : U(X n ) = u(X n )g: (2.5) The next two inequalities (2.6) and (2.7) regarding the stopping time (0) were demonstrated in the course of the proof of Theorem 3.2 of Secchi (1997a) and will be very useful also in the present context. The rst implies that, no matter what player II does, the game will reach the set of states where U = u with probability one if player I uses the stationary family 1 : In fact, set = 1 2 minf k ? k?1 : 0 k mg: Then, for all x 2 S and n 1; P x; 1 (x); (0) n] 2 kuk n (2.6) for all strategies of II where kuk = maxfju(x)j : x 2 Sg; therefore (0) is nite with probability one. Now choose n big enough so that 4 kuk 2 (n ) ?1 : Then, for all x 2 S; E x; 1 (x); u(X (0)^n ) U(x) ? 2 (2.7) against any strategy of player II; this immediately implies that 1 is 2 -optimal for I in L(u): When player I is not allowed to stop the game L(u) immediately, but must play at least for one day, the following result is of use.
2.8 Lemma. For all x 2 S and every strategy of II, P x; 1 (x); (1) < 1] = 1 (2.9) and E x; 1 (x); u(X (1) ) GU(x) ? 2 :
(2.10)
Proof. Equation (2.9) follows from (2.6) and the fact that the conditional stopping time (1) X 1 ] is equal to (0): In fact, for all x 2 S; P x; 1 (x); (1) < 1] = Z P X 1 ; 1 (X 1 ); X 1 ] (0) < 1]dP x; 1 (x); = 1 for all of II.
In order to prove (2.10), assume rst that U(x) > u(x): Then (1) = (0) and, if 4 kuk 2 (n ) ?1 ; E x; 1 (x); u(X (1)^n ) = E x; 1 (x); u(X (0)^n ) U(x) ? 2 = GU(x) ? 2 against any of II, where the last equality follows from the fact that U = u _ GU (Maitra and Sudderth, 1992) . Since u is bounded and (1) is nite with probability one, we get (2.10) in this case by letting n ! 1: If U(x) = u(x); E x; 1 (x); u(X (1) ) = Z E X 1 ; 1 (X 1 ); X 1 ] u(X (0) )dP x; 1 (x); Z (U(X 1 ) ? 2 )dP x; 1 (x); GU(x) ? 2 : for any of II; the next to the last inequality follows from (2.7) by letting n ! 1; whereas the last inequality is a consequence of the de nition of :
We are now ready to return to the nonleavable game N(u) de ned on the nite state space S: Lemma 4.1 of Secchi (1997a) shows that the value V of N(u) is also the value of the leavable game L(u^V ) which is de ned on S and has the same law of motion q and action spaces A and B for I and II respectively as the nonleavable game N(u), but utility u^V: Applying the previous arguments to the game L(u^V ); set > 0 small enough and such that, for all x 2 S; V (x) ? (u^V )(x) < if and only if V (x) = (u^V )(x): Then, for all k 0; the stopping time (k) de ned by (2.5) becomes (k) = inffn k : V (X n ) u(X n )g: Lemma 2.8 implies that there is a stationary family 1 for player I such that, for every x 2 S and every strategy of II, P x; 1 (x); (1) < 1] = 1 (2.11) and E x; 1 (x); (u^V )(X (1) ) GV (x) ? 2 = V (x) ? 2 ; (2.12) where the last equality follows from the fact that GV = V (Maitra and Sudderth, 1996) .
In order to introduce the family of strategies that will be proved to be persistently 4 -optimal for I in N(u); de ne a sequence of stopping times n by setting 0 = 0 and, for all n 0; n+1 = ( n + 1): The family is constructed by sequential composition of the strategies f 1 2 n?1 g along the sequence f n g; n = 1; 2; : : :. That is, for all x 2 S; (x) follows 1 (x) up to time 1 ; then uses 1 2 (X 1 ) up to time 2 and so on. We will begin by proving, with the next two lemmas, that is 4 -optimal for player I. Proof. Note that, for every n 0; x 2 S and of player II, P x; (x); n+1 < 1] = Z P X n ; 1 2 n (X n ); p n ] (1) < 1] dP x; (x); : if P x; (x); n < 1] = 1: Now use (2.11) and induction on n: 2.14 Lemma. is 4 -optimal for I in N(u): Proof. Fix x 2 S and a strategy for II. For ease of notation, in the following we use P for the probability P x; (x); and E for the expected values computed with respect to P:
De ne Y 0 = V (x) and, for every n 1; set Y n = V (X n ) + 2 n?1 X j=0 2 ?j :
The sequence fY n g is a bounded submartingale with respect to P: In fact, for every n 0; jY n j < kuk + 4 and E Y n+1 jX 1 ; : : :; where the rst inequality holds because n+1 p n ] = (1) and V u^V; whereas the second inequality follows from (2.12).
Being a bounded submartingale, fY n g converges with P probability one and Final steps of the proof of Theorem 1.1. In order to prove that is persistently 4 -optimal, it is enough to show that, for every x 2 S; j 1 and partial history p = ((x 1 ; a 1 ; b 1 ); : : :; (x j ; a j ; b j )) of length j; E x j ; (x) g along the sequence f k+n g; n = 1; 2; : : :; and, hence, equals 2 k (x j ): The desired result now follows from Lemma 2.14.
